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REDUNDANT PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
ZACHARY D. CLOPTON* 
 
ABTRACT: Redundancy is a four-letter word. According to courts 
and scholars, redundant litigation is costly, unfair, and confounding. 
Modern civil procedure has a (nearly) maximalist preference for 
centralization, and various rules seek to limit duplicative suits within and 
across court systems. This seemingly dominant view stands in marked 
contrast to the reality of the modern regulatory state. Redundant public-
private enforcement, in which public and private actors have overlapping 
authority to enforce the law, is ubiquitous. Redundant enforcement also is 
noticeably underrepresented in the substantial literature on private and 
public enforcement, which treats government agencies and private 
attorneys general as substitutes rather than complements. 
This Article seeks to fill these gaps. It begins with a survey of the 
myriad forms of redundant public-private enforcement in U.S. law, and 
then turns to a defense of redundant public-private enforcement. Scholars 
of engineering and public administration have built up a powerful 
literature about the potential uses of redundancy, and this Article is the 
first to apply those insights to the use of overlapping public and private 
enforcement in U.S. law. Drawing on those literatures, this Article derives 
principles of redundant enforcement accounting for the diversity of agents 
and the potential for strategic behavior. It argues that redundancy may be 
a response to errors, resource constraints, information problems, and 
agency costs, if redundant-enforcement regimes harness multiple diverse 
agents and are tailored to the relevant regulatory environment. 
Specifically, if the legislature worries that public or private agents are 
missing good cases, redundant authority may help to reduce errors, 
increase resources, aggregate information, and improve monitoring—
though permitting duplicative suits may undercut these gains. 
Meanwhile, if the legislature is concerned about under-enforcing 
settlements or judgments, truly redundant litigation may be a valuable 
tool—though damages must offset to avoid multiple punishments, and 
procedural rules should maintain incentives and allocate cases.  
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1 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
Chief Justice Roberts: [W]hat prevents attorneys general from 
around the country sitting back and waiting until . . . the 
plaintiffs’ class prevails, taking the same complaint, maybe 
even hiring the same lawyers, to go and say, well, now we are 
going to bring our parens patriae action, we know how the 
trial is going to work out, or we know what the settlement is 
going to look like, and we are going to get the same amount of 
money for the State? . . .  
[T]he answer is that there is nothing to prevent fifty attorneys 
general—fifty-one, from saying, every time there is a 
successful class action as to which somebody in my State 
purchased one of the items, we are going to file a parens 
patriae action, the complaint is going to look an awful lot like 
the class action complaint, and we want our money? . . .  
[Y]ou can’t provide any reason why they wouldn’t do so and, 
presumably, would start doing so with greater frequency if 
you prevail in this case. 
~Oral Argument in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU 
Optronics Corporation.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Mississippi ex rel. Hood, the Attorney General of Mississippi 
filed a price-fixing suit on behalf of Mississippi residents against the 
manufacturers, marketers, and distributors of liquid crystal displays 
(LCD).2 The Supreme Court unanimously held that the state’s lawsuit on 
behalf of residents could not be consolidated with private class actions 
adjudicating common claims.3 Though this decision addressed the 
meaning of “mass action” in the Class Action Fairness Act,4 lurking 
behind that definitional question was a concern about duplicative public-
private litigation. Could the state bring claims on behalf of residents when 
overlapping claims were maintained in separate, private class actions? 
Permitting the state to sue separately could allow state governments to 
file lawsuits duplicating private class actions, extorting damages from 
defendants while free-riding on the efforts of private attorneys. 
                                            
1 Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 12-1036 (2013), Oral Argument 
Transcript (hereinafter “Mississippi, Argument”). 
2 Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S.Ct. 736 (2014); Mississippi 
ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2012). 
3 134 S.Ct. 736. 
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (CAFA) (defining “mass action” as “any civil 
action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons . . .”). 
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The Chief Justice’s concerns about follow-on government lawsuits 
recall the frequent criticism of private class actions trailing government 
investigations—so called coattail, tagalong, or piggyback class actions.5 
Professor Coffee, for example, colorfully exhorted the “spectacle, one 
resembling the Oklahoma land rush, in which the filing of the public 
agency’s action serves as the starting gun for a race between private 
attorneys, all seeking to claim the prize of lucrative class action 
settlements, which public law enforcement has gratuitously presented 
them.”6 And Professor Rubenstein said that coattail class counsel 
“provides no independent search skills, no special litigation savvy, and no 
nonpoliticized incentives. She simply piles on and runs up the tab.”7 
Criticism of redundant enforcement is equal opportunity. The 
aforementioned opponents of coattail class actions prefer government 
enforcement to private suits. As Professor Ratliff quipped “[w]hy pay for a 
‘private attorney general’ when there is a public attorney general who 
works for free?”8 Others worry about government enforcement. The 
Chamber of Commerce, no friend to the plaintiffs’ bar, has championed 
environmental citizen suits over EPA intervention.9 Then-Attorney 
General, now-Judge William Pryor described “multigovernment litigation” 
as “the land of public corruption, constitutional subversion, and legalized 
antitrust conspiracies.”10 And Chief Justice Roberts worried aloud that 
government attorneys would pile on and run up the tab against class-
action defendants following the Mississippi decision.11 
More broadly, the mere mention of duplication is met with 
resistance across a range of procedural contexts.12 Modern civil procedure 
                                            
5 E.g., Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, 
Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2000); Jamie Dodge, Privatizing Mass Settlement, 90 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 335 (2014); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency 
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006). 
6 John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983).  
7 William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why it 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004). 
8 Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847 (2000). 
9 See Stephen M. Johnson, Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen 
Suit, 37 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 891 (2014). For a related argument with respect to civil-
rights enforcement, see Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The 
Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998). 
10 William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions 
and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885 (2000). 
11 Mississippi, Argument, supra note __. 
12 See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 582 (3d ed. 1985) (“Failure 
[to join claims] has the consequences of multiplying and prolonging litigation, multiplying 
private and public legal costs, and bringing the system of justice into unnecessary 
disrepute.”); James E. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the 
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evinces a “maximalist” preference against redundancy;13 the American 
Law Institute, in its measured way, has sought to increase opportunities 
for centralization in settlement and litigation;14 and Professor Redish (less 
measuredly) has called for “zero tolerance” of duplicative litigation.15  
As a general matter, these critics are correct. Duplication is costly 
and unfair, and we should worry that unjustified redundancy is the result 
of inattention or worse.16 Accepting this conclusion, however, does not 
mean that redundancy is never justified. Scholars of engineering and 
public administration have built up a powerful literature about the 
potential uses of redundancy,17 and this Article is the first to apply those 
insights to the nearly ubiquitous use of overlapping public and private 
enforcement in U.S. law.18 This Article defends this type of duplication—
what I call “redundant public-private enforcement”—and draws on the 
engineering and political-science literatures to offer a transsubstantive 
template for its use.  
Redundant public-private enforcement describes legal regimes in 
which public and private agents may seek overlapping remedies for the 
same conduct on substantially similar theories. Importantly for the 
normative claims to follow, and in contrast to critics of redundancy, I 
further divide redundant enforcement into “redundant authority” and 
“redundant litigation.” Redundant authority describes the ability of 
multiple agents to bring separate enforcement actions that are mutually 
                                                                                                                       
Limits of Article III, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1423 (2007) (“Congress enacted CAFA in part 
because state court class action practices unfairly burden corporate defendants with 
overlapping and duplicative litigation.”); Richard Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: 
Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 809 (1989) (collecting sources); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social 
Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369 (2008) (collecting sources). 
13 See Lahav, supra note __; Richard L. Marcus, Toward a Maximalist Use of the 
Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245 (2008); Judith 
Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991). 
14 See, e.g., Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (2006). 
15 Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: 
Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1347 (2000). When redundant litigation creates a litigation option for some 
plaintiffs, as it seems to do in Mississippi, courts and scholars are particularly wary. See 
Zachary D. Clopton, Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow of Preclusion, IND. L. J. 
(2015) (collecting sources and decisions denying class certification on this basis). 
16 Public choice may explain some of the existing redundant-enforcement regimes. 
See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (1991). This Article is indifferent to the causes of redundancy. Instead, the 
goal is to understand when and how redundancy can be a valuable legislative strategy.  
17 See infra Section III.A (collecting and discussing relevant literatures). 
18 See infra Part II (surveying areas of law). As noted below, occasionally legal 
scholars have discussed redundancy with respect to specific areas of law or to questions 
unrelated to enforcement. See infra note __. 
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preclusive—public and private actors may have overlapping causes of 
action, but private-enforcement suits preclude future governmental 
litigation on the same claims, and vice versa. As argued below, redundant 
authority across diverse agents responds to errors, resource constraints, 
information problems, or agency costs at the level of case selection. 
Redundant public-private authority should mean that fewer good cases 
are missed, and claims-processing rules should allocate cases to target 
enforcement pathologies. 
Redundant enforcement also may take the form of truly “redundant 
litigation.” Redundant litigation describes regimes in which public and 
private agents may file overlapping lawsuits, and the resolution of one 
suit does not preclude adjudication of the other.19 Redundant litigation 
responds to some of the same problems as redundant authority, but it 
targets case outcomes—undervalued settlements or judgments resulting 
from agent (under-) performance. This Article explains that redundant 
litigation cures existing under-enforcement and deters future under-
enforcement by allowing a second agent to fill the remedial gap, again 
depending on relevant differences between public and private enforcers. 
That said, redundant litigation by itself risks over-enforcement in the 
form of multiple punishments. Thus, legislatures adopting redundant 
litigation should rely on offsets to mitigate over-enforcement and claims-
processing rules to reduce waste.  
The natural place for this defense of redundant public-private 
enforcement is the substantial and growing literature comparing public 
and private enforcement of law.20 But this literature routinely fails to 
grapple with redundant enforcement. The typical article in this vein totes 
up the relative advantages and disadvantages of private and public 
enforcement. These articles treat public and private enforcers as engaged 
in a zero-sum contest for enforcement jurisdiction. These enforcement 
scholars rightly observe that public and private enforcers differ on 
meaningful dimensions. But their conclusions, which assume that public 
and private enforcement are substitutes, miss both the descriptive reality 
and potential normative gains of complementary public and private 
enforcement. Filling these gaps, Part II documents the widespread use of 
redundant public-private enforcement in current law, and Part III draws 
on the engineering and political-science literatures to offer a defense of 
that practice and a template for its implementation. Redundancy may not 
be right fit for every situation, but it is similarly misguided to reject it 
without a second thought. 
                                            
19 Scholars typically treat public and private enforcers as substitutes. See infra 
notes __. As noted above, in redundant authority, agents have complementary authority, 
thought they are substitutes in practice. In redundant litigation, however, agents are 
complementary in authority and in the courtroom. 
20 See infra notes __ (collecting sources on public and private enforcement). 
 
 
 
5 
II. EXISTING REDUNDANT PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
Redundant public-private enforcement is nothing new. The private 
enforcement of public law has been a central regulatory strategy for 
decades,21 with historical antecedents tracing back centuries.22 
Meanwhile, for hundreds of years, governments have sued to vindicate 
seemingly private claims of their citizens,23 culminating in modern 
litigation such as the consumer-protection suit that was the subject of 
Mississippi ex rel. Hood.24 In many of these cases, public and private suits 
overlap. And yet, as noted above, the private and public enforcement 
literature often ignores redundant public-private enforcement.25  
This Part begins by surveying redundant public-private 
enforcement—i.e., enforcement schemes in which public and private 
actors may maintain separate but overlapping suits seeking remedies for 
the same conduct on substantially similar theories.26 This review suggests 
that it is unwise to debate enforcement without considering the 
widespread use of redundant enforcement. This Part then turns to those 
procedural and remedial rules that govern when overlapping public-
private claims are extinguished, maintained, or managed. Significantly, 
there is no universal template for rules on preclusion, damages, and 
claims processing that modulate public-private enforcement. Thus, those 
scholars who fail to engage with the reality of redundant enforcement 
miss an important opportunity to shape policy that is (or at least should 
be) subject to debate. 
                                            
21 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private 
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637 (2013); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role 
of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012). 
22 See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note __ (quoting an email from Professor Stephen 
Yeazell for the proposition that “private litigants for a millennium have sought 
prospective, specific remedies: replevin and ejectment were probably the two most 
commonly used remedies for 800 years, as long as land and livestock were major 
components of the economy”); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law 
Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989). 
23 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (discussing the kingly 
roots of parens patriae). 
24 See supra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing Mississippi). 
25 See infra notes __ (collecting sources). Not all literature on public-private 
enforcement ignores overlapping enforcement completely. Burbank, Farhang, and 
Kritzer’s study expressly identified private, public, and hybrid models. See Burbank, et 
al., supra note __. And yet, even when acknowledging this third option, they addressed 
the advantages and disadvantages of private enforcement without expressly discussing 
redundant litigation. Id. 
26 For example, private suits for compensatory damages would be redundant with 
public suits aggregating all compensable injuries among state residents, but would not be 
redundant with public suits seeking only reimbursement of state Medicaid funds. 
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A. Redundant Enforcement Regimes 
This Section describes a range of examples of public-private 
enforcement, loosely grouped into three categories: (1) “private” claims; 
(2) “public” claims; and (3) hybrid regimes. These categories are blurry, 
but crisp divisions are not necessary here. The purpose of these divisions 
is to draw a general outline of the public-private enforcement landscape.  
1. “Private” Claims 
On one end of the spectrum are cases in which government actors 
bring claims that seem to address private rights.27 I refer here to rights 
for which private parties have a remedy in court, so public enforcement 
necessarily has the capacity to overlap with private suits in these cases. 
Many examples of public enforcement of private claims fall under 
the parens patriae label.28 Parens patriae refers to the common-law right 
of a sovereign to bring suit on behalf of its citizens, though the term has 
been used to describe a larger set of governmental actions that seek to 
vindicate private rights.29 Parens patriae actions address a wide range of 
issues. Notable cases have involved claims related to asbestos,30 tobacco,31 
and firearms,32 and less well-known examples can be found in antitrust, 
tax, insurance, and other areas.33  
A useful illustration from comes from Mississippi ex rel. Hood, 
which provided the quotation at the start of this Article.34 In that case, 
the State of Mississippi filed an antitrust and consumer protection suit on 
                                            
27 See, e.g., Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2014); Adam S. Zimmerman, Mass Settlement Rivalries, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 381 (2013); 
Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State 
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012) (hereinafter “Lemos, Aggregate 
Litigation); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the 
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Conception, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012); Adam S. 
Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011); Richard P. Ieyoub & 
Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the 
Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859 (2000). 
28 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining parens patriae to 
mean, inter alia, “[a] doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit 
on behalf of a citizen”). See also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 
(1982) (discussing parens patriae in U.S. law). 
29 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note __. These public suits may draw on 
common-law or statutory sources for substantive rights as well as for the authority to 
bring such actions. Id. See, e.g., supra note __ (citing Mississippi laws). 
30 E.g., Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. 15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1993). 
31 See generally Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note __ (discussing tobacco litigation). 
32 See generally David Kairys, The Origin and Development of the Governmental 
Handgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163 (2000). 
33 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note __ (collecting cases). See, e.g., 11 
U.S.C. § 526 (authorizing private and state actions against debt relief agencies). 
34 See supra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing Mississippi). 
 
 
 
7 
behalf of state residents against the LCD industry.35 The state sought 
equitable and monetary relief on behalf of its citizens under antitrust and 
consumer-protection statutes, even though citizens had private rights of 
action under the same laws.36 The Supreme Court held that the state suit 
could go forward in state court despite a consolidated, nationwide class 
action alleging the same claims.37 
2.  “Public” Claims 
On the other end of the spectrum are cases in which private actors 
litigate seemingly public rights.38 Again, these private suits complement 
public enforcement of the same claims. 
The so-called “citizen suit” exemplifies the private enforcement of 
public rights.39 The citizen suit is characterized by a lawsuit for injunctive 
or declaratory relief in order to compel compliance with the law, though 
many citizen-suit provisions permit monetary awards as well.40 Citizen-
suit options are particularly common in environmental statutes.41 Indeed, 
according to Professor Thompson, “[e]very major environmental law 
passed since 1970 now includes a citizen suit provision (with the 
anomalous exception of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
                                            
35 134 S.Ct. 736. 
36 See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 
2012). Individual consumers had causes of action under the same statutes. Id. At least 
some private claims were settled prior to the Court’s decision. See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD 
(Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, No. 07-1827, 2013 WL 1365900 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013). 
37 Id. The nationwide suit was consolidated in federal court pursuant to the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453 & 1711–15. See supra note __. 
38 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An 
Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming); Burbank, et al., supra note __; 
SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2010); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private 
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 
93 (2005) (hereinafter “Stephenson, Public Regulation”); Rubenstein, supra note __; 
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002); Erichson, supra note __; A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 
(1980); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, 
Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974). 
39 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “citizen suit” to 
mean “[a]n action under a statute giving citizens the right to sue violators of the law (esp. 
environmental law) and to seek injunctive relief and penalties”). 
40 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (granting district courts the authority to “apply 
any appropriate civil penalties” in Clean Water Act citizen suits). 
41 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604; Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-59; Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-40(g). 
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Rodenticide Act).”42 Explicit citizen-suit provisions also exist in consumer-
protection and voting-rights statutes, among others.43 And at common 
law, private and public actors may be able to bring overlapping claims 
variously described as “diffuse private rights” or “common public rights”—
for example, a suit for the enjoyment of natural resources.44 In each of the 
cases, public and private parties have the option to enforce the law. 
Sometimes private and public enforcers may each seek monetary relief,45 
and sometimes private attorneys may collect attorney fees from 
defendants if they win.46 
In addition, in some circumstances, private parties stand in the 
shoes of the government. In qui tam cases,47 a private party prosecutes a 
claim on behalf of the government—for example, a claim that a 
government contractor has defrauded a federal agency.48 Private parties 
may litigate these cases themselves, or the government may intervene 
and displace the private suit.49 Either way, the private party may share in 
the government’s recovery.50 
3. Hybrid Regimes 
The grey area between parens patriae suits vindicating private 
claims and citizen suits pursuing public-interest enforcement is expansive 
in breadth and depth. It would be impossible to survey every such 
                                            
42 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 192. But see 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (no citizen suits for Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (no citizen suits for NEPA).  
43 Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2072-73 (creating a private right of 
action for injunction (and fees) to enforce product safety rules); National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9 (private party may seek declaratory or 
injunctive relief and fees). Indeed, one might say that injunctive-relief provisions of any 
hybrid statute authorize citizen suits. See infra Section II.A.3 (collecting hybrid regimes). 
44 E.g., Alaska Sport Fishing Assn. v. Exxon, 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cit. 1994); Friends 
of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage, 382 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2004). 
45 See, e.g., Alaska Sport Fishing Assn., 34 F.3d at 770 (“Alaska Sportfishing 
Association and four individual sportfishers . . . [filed suit] seeking damages for loss of use 
and enjoyment of natural resources resulting from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.”). 
46 See FARHANG, supra note __ (collecting data). Public attorneys also may be able 
to recover costs. See, e.g., Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279 (1902). 
47 Qui tam is short for qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte 
sequitur, or “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
48 The most well-known U.S. qui tam statute is the Federal False Claims Act, 31 
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., though qui tam provisions also exist in state false claims acts, e.g., 
Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12650-56; 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 175/1-8; 6 Del. C. §§ 1201-11, as well 
as in other federal statutes. 25 U.S.C. § 201 (Indian protection laws); 35 U.S.C. § 292 
(false marking of patented goods, prior to 2011 amendments). 
49 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (permitting the government to take over FCA suit). 
50 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (providing relator recovery of 15 to 25 percent if the 
government intervenes or 25 to 30 percent if the government does not). 
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provision in a digestible format, but it is worth considering the range of 
regimes to better understand the place of redundant public-private 
enforcement in U.S. law.51 
Perhaps the easiest way to organize this material is by area of law, 
and I will begin here with antitrust enforcement. Antitrust law serves 
both public and private values. According to the Supreme Court: 
“Congress created the Sherman Act’s private cause of action not solely to 
compensate individuals, but to promote ‘the public interest in vigilant 
enforcement of the antitrust laws.’”52 There is overlapping public and 
private enforcement of the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act, 
Clayton Act, and sections of the Robinson-Partman Act and Wilson Tariff 
Act.53 Importantly for present purposes, public and private antitrust 
enforcement may proceed redundantly. Private enforcement of antitrust 
law frequently takes the form of “coattail class actions,” which are private 
suits following the announcement of public enforcement.54 Private actions 
also might alert public regulators of a potential problem, leading to follow-
on public enforcement.55 Finally, public and private recoveries may 
interact as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has dedicated some 
disgorgement awards from government antitrust settlements for 
distribution to private parties.56 
Securities enforcement tracks many elements of the antirust-law 
story. Securities suits claim to vindicate both private and public values.57 
Securities law is characterized by a high degree of private enforcement, 
                                            
51 Most of the examples here are from federal law, though state law also may 
provide for overlapping enforcement. See, e.g., Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Private 
Attorney General Doctrine—State Cases, 106 A.L.R. 5th 523 (collecting state cases). 
52 American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) 
(quoting Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955)). 
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (referring to “antitrust laws,” defined in 15 U.S.C. § 12).  
54 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note __ (noting that more than one hundred “coattail 
class actions” followed the government’s antitrust investigation of Microsoft). 
55 See, e.g., Arthur M. Kaplan, Antitrust as a Public-Private Partnership: A Case 
Study of the NASDAQ Litigation, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 111 (2001) (noting that private 
lawsuits “resuscitated” public antitrust enforcement against NASDAQ). This 
phenomenon is not unique to antitrust. See Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals From 
Private Attorneys General in Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 518 (2001) 
(“Private attorneys general, not government regulators, discovered that Firestone Tires 
mounted on Ford Explorers caused hundreds of rollover accidents due to tread separation. 
. . . The NHTSA [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration] based its recall of 6.5 
million tires on information provided by plaintiff’s counsel, rather than [by] in-house 
government investigators.”). 
56 See, e.g., In re First Databank Antitrust Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 96, 101 (D.D.C. 
2002) (discussing FTC settlement offset); Fed. Trade Comm’n, Policy Statement (Aug. 4, 
2003), 68 FR 45820-03, 2003 WL 21780660 (F.R.) (discussing FTC’s use of restitution). 
57 E.g., PSLRA, S. Rep. 104-98 at 8 (discussing compensation and deterrence). 
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whether through implied58 or express59 rights of action, but it also 
involves public enforcement by various federal and state agencies.60 
Private action may ride the coattails of public enforcement,61 or may 
motivate it.62 Finally, like the FTC, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) attempts to compensate victims of securities fraud 
through the “fair funds program,” which distributes recoveries collected in 
public enforcement actions to private parties—even when redundant 
private securities actions may be available.63 
Redundant private and public enforcement is also quite common in 
civil rights, labor, and employment. Public and private parties may bring 
overlapping employment suits alleging discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin,64 disability,65 or age.66 Public and 
private suits can vindicate federal rules on minimum wage or maximum 
hour,67 family and medical leave,68 whistleblower protection,69 or migrant 
and seasonal agricultural worker standards.70 The Fair Housing Act 
provides for overlapping public and private enforcement,71 and courts 
                                            
58 See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 
(1993) (1934 Securities Exchange Act, Section 10(b) contribution action); Merrill Lynch v. 
Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (Commodities Exchange Act); Superintendent of Ins. v. 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (1934 Securities Exchange Act, Section 10(b)); 
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (1934 Securities Exchange Act, Section 14(a)). 
59 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i (manipulation of security prices); 15 U.S.C. § 78r 
(misleading statements); 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (insider trading). 
60 See SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939 (1935) (holding that the SEC had 
independent litigating authority); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352-359-h (“Martin Act”) 
(providing authority to New York State Attorney General). For criticism of the claim that 
private enforcement supplements SEC enforcement, see Maria Correia & Michael 
Klausner, Are Securities Class Actions “Supplemental” to SEC Enforcement? (in progress). 
61 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note __. 
62 See supra note __ (discussing NASDAQ case). 
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 7246. See generally Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for 
Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming); Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured 
Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103 (2008). Private class actions were filed in 65% of cases in 
which the SEC created a fair fund, and investors were entitled to private recoveries in 
nearly half of these cases. Id. 
64 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Title VII). 
65 29 U.S.C. § 626 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Americans with Disabilities Act) 
67 29 U.S.C. § 216 (Fair Labor Standards Act). 
68 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (Family and Medical Leave Act). 
69 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
70 29 U.S.C. §§ 1852-54 (Migrant & Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 3613. 
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have found implied private rights of action in various civil rights statutes 
that also authorize public enforcement.72 
Private and public enforcement overlap in any number of other 
federal and state enforcement schemes. The Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) relies on private and public actions,73 as do many 
state and federal consumer-protection statutes.74 Public and private civil 
actions may enforce the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO) as well.75 More obscurely, the U.S. Attorney General, state 
attorneys general, and “boxers” may sue under the Muhammad Ali Boxing 
Reform Act,76 and educational institutions and the FTC may sue sports 
agents for unfair and deceptive acts with respect to student athletes.77  
Finally, although not entirely relevant to this Article’s inquiry, 
there are various statutory schemes in which public criminal enforcement 
operates in parallel with public or private civil enforcement.78 RICO79 and 
some antirust rules80 may be enforced through criminal prosecution or 
civil suits. Criminal and private civil enforcement also are available in 
connection with sexual exploitation or child abuse,81 and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act has private civil, public civil, and public 
criminal provisions.82 During Prohibition, criminal enforcement of the 
alcohol laws was supplemented by private civil actions for property 
                                            
72 E.g., Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996) (Section 10 of the 
Voting Rights Act (“VRA”)); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (Section 2 of the 
VRA); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Title IX); Allen v. State Bd. of 
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Section 5 of the VRA). 
73 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
74 Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private 
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1430 n.189 (2000) 
(discussing Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o, 1681s 
(public and private enforcement under the Truth in Lending Act); 39 U.S.C. § 3017 
(liability for mailing skill contest or sweepstakes to individual who requested exclusion); 
47 U.S.C. § 227 (liability for telephone solicitation to individual who requested exclusion). 
75 18 U.S.C. § 1964. 
76 15 U.S.C. § 6309. “Boxer” is defined as “an individual who fights in a 
professional boxing match.” 15 U.S.C. § 6301. 
77 15 U.S.C. §§ 7803, 7805. For a few other examples, see 12 U.S.C §§ 1972, 1975 
(private and public enforcement against bank tying arrangements); 47 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 
274 (rights of action under the Communication Act); 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 597 & 597a 
(private and public actions under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act). 
78 Criminal law also may overlap with common-law liability. See, e.g., Thomas 
Koenig & Michael Rustad, “Crimtorts” as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 289 (1998). 
79 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. 
80 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. 
81 18 U.S.C. § 2255; Paroline v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1710 (2014) (discussing 
criminal restitution to victims of child pornography).  
82 18 U.S.C. § 2520. 
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damage by an intoxicated person against the provider of liquor.83 And, 
amusingly, while the U.S. government offers awards to private parties 
who help detect customs violations, if a public officials tips off a private 
party in exchange for a share of that award, she may be the subject of a 
criminal prosecution and the complicit private party may bring a civil 
action to get her money back.84 Although criminal restitution reflects 
some elements of the public enforcement discussed here, this Article’s 
focus remains on overlapping civil enforcement. 
B. Managing Redundancy 
Whether private, public, or hybrid subject matter, each of the 
described regimes allows both public and private actors to bring suit. But 
the authority to sue on the same claim does not tell the whole story. The 
procedural and remedial rules that govern these suits provide important 
context. Preclusion determines whether redundant litigation is 
maintained or extinguished. Damages rules determine whether 
consecutive actions will manifest in redundant payouts—whether 
defendants pay twice, and whether redundant plaintiffs recover 
irrespective of the first case. Claims-processing rules determine whether 
redundant litigation is sequential or simultaneous, and which party’s suit 
goes first. This Section reviews the varied approaches to preclusion, 
damages, and claims processing in redundant enforcement in U.S. law. At 
best, current law offers an extensive experiment into manifold 
combinations of these rules. Less charitably, current law is a muddle 
calling out for the coherence that Part III hopes to offer. 
1. Preclusion 
The first potential management tool for redundant enforcement is 
preclusion. Although preclusion has a precise legal definition,85 it is used 
here to refer to any situation in which prior adjudication forecloses a 
future suit, whether based on a judicially enunciated rule or a statute-
specific requirement.86 In particular, this Article is concerned with the 
effect of a prior disposition on a non-party plaintiff—the effect of a 
settlement or judgment in a public suit on a putative private plaintiff, or 
vice versa.87 Again, if the first suit precludes the second, then redundant 
                                            
83 Section 32, Act Oct. 28, 1919, c. 85, Title II, § 20, 41 Stat. 313 (repealed). 
84 19 U.S.C. § 1620.  
85 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments, ch. 3. 
86 See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
87 This discussion may bring to mind United States v. Mendoza, in which the 
Supreme Court held that nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the 
federal government. 464 U.S. 154 (1984). Nonmutual offensive issue preclusion describes 
a new plaintiff’s use of a finding of fact from an earlier proceeding to establish part of its 
case against the defendant from that earlier case. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Even if one accepted the Mendoza rule uncritically, it relates 
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authority stops short of redundant litigation. If preclusion does not attach, 
redundant litigation is permitted and the second suit proceeds without 
regard to the outcome in the first case.88 
To begin with a general observation, public and private suits are 
neither universally preclusive nor universally non-preclusive. In some 
situations, public and private enforcement actions are mutually non-
preclusive. In antitrust, for example, the Supreme Court explained that 
“the Government is not bound by private antitrust litigation to which it is 
a stranger,” while “private parties, similarly situated, are not bound by 
government litigation.”89 Likewise, in various voting-rights cases, courts 
have allowed public litigation to follow private suits on the same claims, 
or vice versa.90 These cases thus permit redundant litigation. 
In other situations, public and private suits are mutually 
preclusive. Traditionally, preclusion does not attach to non-parties.91 But 
in some cases of redundant public-private enforcement, preclusion applies 
to non-parties as a result of common-law exceptions to the background 
rule,92 special considerations for government representation,93 or specific 
statutory provisions.94 Courts have found preclusion between public and 
private actions in cases involving ERISA,95 the Age Discrimination in 
                                                                                                                       
to findings adverse to a party to both proceedings—but here we are potentially dealing 
with the effect of findings on a nonparty. 
88 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
89 Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961). 
90 E.g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 268 n. 23 (1982) (“The Attorney General 
is not bound by the resolution of § 5 issues in cases to which he was not a party.”), 
Cleveland Cty. Assn. v. Cleveland Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 142 F.3d 468, 473–74 & n. 11 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (private following public). 
91 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989). 
92 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (discussing privity). 
93 For example, whether the government adequately represented its citizens has 
been treated differently by courts than private versions of the same inquiry. See Lemos, 
Aggregate Litigation, supra note __. Indeed, some courts “presume that the state will 
adequately represent the position of its citizens.” Alaska Sport Fishing, 34 F.3d at 773. 
94 See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Sarafoglou v. Weill Medical College, 451 F.Supp.2d 613 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“In the qui tam context, the relator is in privity with the Government.”). 
95 E.g., Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1462-63 (5th Cir. 1983); Herman 
v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1422–27 (11th Cir. 1998); Beck v. Levering, 
947 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1991); Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 687–
97 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Courts reaching this conclusion seek to cast ERISA in public-
minded terms. See, e.g., Herman, 140 F.3d at 1423 (“[I]n suing for ERISA violations, the 
Secretary seeks not only to recoup plan losses, but also to supervise enforcement of 
ERISA, to guarantee uniform compliance with ERISA, to expose and deter plan asset 
mismanagement, to protect federal revenues, to safeguard the enormous amount of assets 
and investments funded by ERISA plans, and to assess civil penalties for ERISA 
violations.”). One could say the same about any number of statutes that protect private 
rights. See supra notes __. 
 
 
 
14 
Employment Act,96 and the Fair Labor Standards Act,97 to name a few.98 
Qui tam regimes also may apply mutual non-party preclusion,99 though 
the meaning of “party” is complicated by this peculiar type of suit.100 
In still other areas, preclusion is asymmetric. Some statutes codify 
one-way preclusion. A number of civil rights statutes provide that private 
actions may be cut off by public enforcement,101 and EPA actions trump 
environmental citizen suits even though private suits would not preclude 
public enforcement.102 Particularly when the government is pursuing a 
public-oriented remedy, there seems to be a background understanding 
that private actions do not preclude redundant public enforcement.103 
Meanwhile, many courts are willing to treat representative public actions 
as preclusive on private suits—i.e., private citizens may not litigate 
individual claims if the state previously litigated on their behalf.104 In 
sum, public-private preclusion attaches in some but not all cases; it may 
depend on judicial doctrine, statutory language, and case-specific factors; 
and it may be symmetrical or asymmetrical. 
                                            
96 The ADEA provides that public enforcement bars subsequent private suits. See 
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1). Some courts have treated private ADEA suits as preclusive on the 
EEOC. E.g., EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir.1990) (Alito, J.). 
97 Compare Chao v. A-One Medical Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 920–23 (9th Cir. 
2003) (private FLSA suit bars public enforcement) with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing that 
public suits preclude subsequent private suits). 
98 Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protections limit private actions if the DOL 
issued a final decision. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. At least one court held that a private judgment 
precluded future public enforcement. Leon v. IDX Systems, 464 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2006).  
99 In re Schimmels held that the government is bound by the result of a qui tam 
suit even if it did not intervene. 127 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1997). The government conceded 
this point at oral argument in KBR v. United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-1497 (Jan. 13, 
2015). Relatedly, some courts reject pro se relators because of the government may be 
precluded. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 94 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
100 For discussion of a related issue, see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. 
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) (Article III standing in qui tam suits). 
101 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (Fair Housing Act); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Fair Labor Standards Act). 
102 See supra note __ (collecting statutory provisions). For example, according to 
the Ninth Circuit: “the United States would not be bound by the proposed consent 
judgment in this action [under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act] and could bring 
its own enforcement action at any time.” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, 
Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1356 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted). 
103 See, e.g., 18A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4458.1 (2d ed.). But this rough guide 
does not account for all cases nor does it explain which hybrid cases are public or private.  
104 See, e.g., Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (10th 
Cir. 1993). Courts retain discretion to determine if the government suit sufficiently 
represented private interests. See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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2. Damages 
Damages rules are a second set of tools to structure public-private 
enforcement. Civil damages are the central form of deterrence and 
compensation in many of these areas, and the ability to obtain damages is 
a key incentive for enforcement actions.105 Under various statutes, public 
and private actors may obtain overlapping remedies,106 though at times 
damages are characterized differently for public and private parties.107 
Related to damages are private attorney fees, which may be a necessary 
incentive for private actions.108 Attorney fees are available in some but 
not all cases.109 
If redundant authority becomes redundant litigation, an important 
question is whether damages are cumulative or concurrent—will a 
defendant pay double because she is subject to sequential enforcement 
suits?110 The answer to this question has significant consequences for 
(over- or under-) deterrence, (over- or under-) compensation, and 
fairness.111 Again, outcomes are not consistent across regulatory areas.112 
In both antitrust and securities enforcement, for example, the general 
rule is that a defendant will be able to offset compensatory or 
disgorgement awards.113 If recoveries in a public suit are characterized as 
                                            
105 See, e.g., supra notes __ (discussing antitrust and securities enforcement). 
106 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (Fair Housing Act); 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (ERISA); 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a (employment discrimination).  
107 For example, private suits for bank-tying arrangements receive treble 
damages, while public enforcement seeks civil penalties. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1972, 1975. 
Available remedies also may differ markedly between public and private suits. E.g., 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78t-1(b), 78u-1(a)(2) (civil penalties to SEC and private actions for profit gained 
or loss avoided in insider trading). 
108 See, e.g., Burbank, et al., supra note __ (collecting data on fee provisions in 
private-enforcement statutes); FARHANG, supra note __. 
109 See id. Interestingly, attorney fees do not always depend on private recovery. 
In antitrust suits, even when a prior settlement with a co-defendant reduced a plaintiff’s 
right to compensatory damages to zero, courts will permit litigation against the non-
settling defendant for purpose of determining whether plaintiff is entitled to fees. See, 
e.g., Funeral Consumers Alliance. v. Service Corp. Intern., 695 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2012). 
110 See infra note __ (collecting sources on “multiple punishments”). 
111 See, e.g., Winship, supra note __ (discussing McAfee securities case). 
112 The Supreme Court has cautioned on multiple occasions that “it goes without 
saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.” EEOC 
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002); General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. 
EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980). But, of course, the issue here is not double recovery by 
the same party, but double liability paid by the same defendant to two different parties. 
See infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing compensation). And, notably, the 
Court’s logic depended in part on the equitable nature of Title VII remedies, a status 
unlikely to attach to damage awards in most statutory and common-law schemes. See 
General Telephone, 446 U.S. at 333. 
113 E.g., Litton Indus. v. Lehman, 734 F.Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (securities); 
In re First Databank Antitrust Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2002) (antitrust). That 
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civil penalties, they will be independent of private damages, i.e., they are 
not subject to offset.114 Courts have taken steps in other areas to avoid 
double liability,115 but again public and private remedies do not always 
offset symmetrically.116 Reliance on judicial discretion also adds 
uncertainty to the enforcement regime. 
3. Claims Processing 
Finally, relevant to both redundant authority and redundant 
litigation are various doctrines that loosely fall under the label “claims 
processing.”117 Courts have at their disposal tools such as stays and 
antisuit injunctions that can modulate otherwise simultaneous private 
and public enforcement actions.118 Various enforcement statutes also 
include specific claim-processing rules. For example, environmental 
statutes often require private notice to the government,119 while the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 called for notice to effected private parties.120 
Sometimes the notice provision has direct consequences for litigation: in 
environmental statutes, private plaintiffs give notice to the government in 
order to permit the EPA to bring a public enforcement proceeding.121  
Claims-processing rules may give priority to particular plaintiffs. 
Environmental citizen-suit provisions exhibit a preference for public 
enforcement, barring private suits if the government is diligently 
prosecuting.122 Other statutes allow multiple parties to join the same suit: 
some enforcement regimes expressly allow for private intervention into 
public suits,123 while others allow public intervention into private suits.124 
                                                                                                                       
said, courts have found ways to permit redundant suits to go forward even following 
public disgorgement awards. See, e.g., In re Spear, 399 F.Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
The relationship between fair fund distributions and private settlements also appears 
inconsistent. See, e.g., In re American Intern. Group, No. 04-8141, Dkt. 699 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(describing one settlement that accounts for fair funds and one that does not). 
114 E.g., Litton Indus., 734 F.Supp. 1071; First Databank, 209 F. Supp. 2d 96. 
115 See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980).  
116 See, e.g., Herman, 140 F.3d 1413 (collecting ERISA and non-ERISA cases). 
117 See Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). 
118 While courts have the inherent authority to enjoin parties, the ability to enjoin 
litigation in other courts is not so broad. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (Anti-Injunction Act). 
119 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(2) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(2) 
(Clean Air Act). Environmental statutes are not unique in this regard. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6104 (private actions against telemarketers). 
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n).  
121 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (Clean 
Air Act).  
122 See supra notes __. Not all government action is “diligent.” See, e.g., Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 178 n.1 (2000). 
123 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Title VII); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (CWA). 
124 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 227 (private rights of action and FCC intervention in 
suits regarding telephone equipment). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2)(A). 
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In some cases, failing to intervene may be understood as acquiescence in 
the first representation, thus triggering preclusion of future actions.125 
*          *          * 
The takeaways from this brief survey are twofold. First, redundant 
public-private enforcement does not exist in a vacuum, but is subject to 
rules that structure how and when claims may be brought. Redundant 
authority becomes redundant litigation only if preclusion rules allow the 
second suit, while damages and claims-processing rules structure 
enforcement in either case. Second, there is no uniform template for how 
redundant public-private enforcement proceeds in U.S. law. Instead, 
legislatures and courts have applied different procedural approaches to 
different regulatory regimes. Whether those choices have been justified 
requires a deeper understanding of the institutions and goals of 
redundant public-private enforcement. 
III. DESIGNING REDUNDANT PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
The foregoing discussion suggests that redundant authority and 
litigation exist across a range of enforcement schemes, yet the trend in 
modern procedure is to oppose duplication in favor of centralization.126 
The logic of this opposition is straightforward: redundancy creates direct 
costs as compared with one-shot enforcement; employing multiple 
enforcers may complicate a simple single-enforcer model; and duplication 
may lead to over-enforcement.127 
There is no dispute that these costs exist, and lawmakers 
developing enforcement regimes should work to avoid them. But it would 
be a mistake to stop there—redundancy has some advantages that could 
be relevant to many enforcement challenges. This Part begins with a brief 
review of the potential benefits of redundant enforcement, specifically 
focusing on errors, resources, information, and agency costs. The claim 
here is that, despite obvious costs, redundant enforcement may serve 
valuable legislative goals, particularly when multiple diverse agents can 
be harnessed toward the same ends. Of course, the benefits of redundant 
enforcement will not spring up without careful husbandry in the form of 
institutional design. After surveying redundancy theory, this Part picks 
up the institutional-design challenge, looking first at redundancy as a 
response to problems with case selection and then as a response to 
                                            
125 In Adams v. Proctor & Gamble, the Fourth Circuit held that a private plaintiff 
who did not intervene in an EEOC suit was bound by the outcome of the government’s 
action. 697 F.2d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per curiam). 
126 See infra notes __ and accompanying text. Part II also suggests that scholars 
writing on public-private enforcement are wrong to ignore enforcement redundancy.  
127 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 
YALE L. J. 616 (2013); Burbank, et al., supra note __; Vermeule, supra note__; Lahav, 
supra note __. 
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problems with case outcomes. The result is a defense of redundant public-
private enforcement and a transsubstantive template for its use. This 
discussion is aimed not only at critics of redundant enforcement, but also 
at legislatures creating and updating enforcement regimes and at courts 
considering procedural decisions that interact with legislative choices.128  
A. Redundancy Theory 
While legal scholars have been slow to appreciate the benefits of 
redundancy, other disciplines have taken the lead.129 Engineers have 
explored how redundant components can increase systemic reliability 
when components are independent.130 Political scientists have applied 
these lessons to public administration, noting the presence of redundant 
structures within highly reliable organizations, and exploring how to 
manage strategic behavior within redundant systems.131 This Section 
synthesizes these insights and applies them to law enforcement. This 
Section first outlines the basic claim that redundancy can improve 
                                            
128 See infra note __ (discussing, for example, Shady Grove). 
129 Works particularly helpful for the present study include Michael Ting, A 
Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SC. 274 (2003); C. F. LARRY 
HEIMANN, ACCEPTABLE RISKS: POLITICS, POLICY, AND RISKY TECHNOLOGIES (1998); Allan 
Lerner, There Is More than One Way to Be Redundant, 18 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 334 (1986); 
JONATHAN B. BENDOR, PARALLEL STRUCTURES: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT (1985); 
Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 
29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 (1969). 
Recently, a few legal scholars have praised redundancy. Professor Lahav revived 
Professor Cover’s notion of complex concurrency. Lahav, supra note __ (discussing Robert 
M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981)). Professor Gersen articulated the value of overlap in 
administrative law. Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in 
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201. Professor Huq assessed redundancy in 
terrorism prosecutions. Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1415 (2012). And Professor Kobayashi reviewed redundant litigation in intellectual 
property. Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Relitigation Rules in Intellectual 
Property Litigation (forthcoming). Notably, these few defenses focused on particular areas 
of law and/or have ignored the public-or-private identity of the redundant enforcers. 
130 The engineering literature distinguishes between component failure and 
system failure. See, e.g., HEIMANN, supra note__. Redundancy is understood to be more 
effective when dealing with component failure, id., and therefore the discussion here 
focuses on component failure in law enforcement. 
131 Modern debates about redundancy often pit the “highly reliable organization” 
(HRO) paradigm against “normal accident” theory. Cf. K.E. WEICK & K.M. SUTCLIFFE, K. 
M. MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: ASSURING HIGH PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 
(1st ed. 2001) with CHARLES PERROW NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK 
TECHNOLOGIES (1999). In the words of Larry Heimann, HRO theory accepts “the need for 
redundancy within and between organizations,” while normal accident theory “disputes[s] 
the value of redundancy” when facing “complex interactions and tight coupling.” 
HEIMANN, supra note __. This is not a forum to adjudicate every aspect of these debates, 
though I would note that there are reasons to think that law-enforcement regimes are not 
always “highly complex” or “tightly coupled.” 
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enforcement with respect to errors, resources, information, and agency 
costs, if actors are sufficiently differentiated—applying the lessons of 
engineering to the problems of law enforcement. This Section then uses 
the insights of political science to identify and deal with the potential for 
strategic behavior, including efforts to harness strategic behavior in a 
positive direction. Note that this Section’s theory of redundancy depends 
on whether laws are over- or under-enforced (with respect to case 
selection and case outcomes).132 This Article does not offer a universal 
baseline for these questions, but instead recognizes that results must be 
judged against legislative preferences expressed in the relevant 
regulatory regime. 
First, however the optimum level of enforcement is defined, 
redundancy can respond to under-enforcement resulting from random or 
non-random (biased) errors.133 Redundancy may reduce under-
enforcement resulting from random error because enforcers will not 
repeat the same errors in case selection or prosecution.134 This is the 
“purest” engineering theory of redundancy—if parallel components 
function independently, both must fail to result in system error.135 
Redundancy also may reduce under-enforcement resulting from 
nonrandom bias, as long as the agents have different biases.136 Although 
neither public nor private agents are perfect, there are good reasons to 
believe that public and private enforcers possess different preferences and 
interests, and thus are susceptible to different non-random biases.137 The 
result is that employing both public and private agents should reduce 
biased under-enforcement as well. Note, however, that while redundancy 
may decrease Type II errors (false negatives), it also may increase Type I 
                                            
132 See, e.g., George Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 
526 (1970); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1997). The distinction between case selection and case 
outcomes is taken up further in Sections III.B and III.C. 
133 Note that this discussion primarily addresses the problems of under-
enforcement. Redundancy is not likely a solution to over-enforcement, and its use in areas 
characterized by over-enforced should be viewed with a jaundiced eye.  
134 See, e.g., Cover, supra note __ at 657.  
135 See David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principal-Agent Problems, and 
Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2006) (referring to this reliability-
enhancing feature as “purely engineering”). Indeed, Landau’s early advocacy for 
redundancy was inspired by a commercial airliner. Landau, supra note __.  
136 See, e.g., Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and 
Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SC. 617, 625-30 (1992); Ting, supra note __. 
137 See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note __ (discussing distinction between the 
rewards for public and private attorneys). See also Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, 
For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEG. STUD. 289 (1983). For a classic study 
of prosecutorial discretion, see Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal 
System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036 (1972). 
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errors (false positives).138 This is the risk of over-enforcement noted by 
redundancy’s critics, and certainly it must be part of the institutional-
design discussion as well.139 
A second explanation for under-enforcement is resource 
constraints—an agent may under-enforce because it lacks the resources to 
identify and prosecute all of the cases it wants.140 It does not take a degree 
in engineering to understand that if independent redundant agents bring 
different resources to a problem, then the total resources available will be 
increased. Unsurprisingly, resource constraints are an oft-cited 
explanation for under-enforcement,141 and redundancy should improve 
this state of affairs if agents possess different resource pools. Scholars 
have argued about whether public or private enforcers are more resource 
constrained,142 but it seems reasonable to assume that their resources 
differ, particularly given that some funding mechanisms (e.g., alternative 
litigation financing; contingency fees) are not equally available to public 
and private parties.143 
Third, under-enforcement may result if the relevant agent lacks 
the necessary information or expertise. Redundancy may help in these 
cases as well. Redundancy may serve to reveal private information, 
aggregate disparate information, and facilitate learning.144 Redundancy 
also permits “perspectival aggregation,” as agents may offer a diversity of 
problem-solving approaches.145 As with tangible resources, the benefits of 
redundancy attach when agents possess complementary intangible 
                                            
138 See, e.g., Ting, supra note __; Huq, supra note __. 
139 See, e.g., infra Section III.C.2.  
140 Resource constraints are, in a sense, just another cause of errors, but they 
merit special attention here because they are particularly salient for enforcement issues. 
141 See, e.g., Burbank, et al., supra note __. Regarding securities regulation, a 
SEC Chairman observed that “[t]he Commission has long maintained that private actions 
provide valuable and necessary additional deterrence against securities fraud, thereby 
supplementing the Commission’s own enforcement activities.” Testimony of Arthur 
Levitt, Jr., Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong., 1997 WL 416650. 
142 Cf. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note __ (public enforcers more 
constrained) with Engstrom, supra note __ (private parties cannot “scale up”).  
143 But see Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: 
Constitutional and Political Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77 (2010) (discussing 
public use of contingency fee); David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: 
Toward a Normative Evaluation of Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 
DEPAUL L. REV. 315 (2001) (same). In addition, it seems likely that public and private 
resources vary (but may not co-vary) with time, issue, litigant, etc. 
144 See, e.g., Matthew Stephenson, Information Acquisition & Institutional 
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2011) (hereinafter “Stephenson, Information 
Acquisition”); Huq, supra note __. 
145 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 1435 (2011); Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents, 
97 J. ECON. THEORY 123 (2001). 
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resources such as information.146 And, again, public and private enforcers 
likely differ in their access to information, expertise, and perspectives.147 
A final potential source of under-enforcement is inherent in the 
agency relationship. Principals incur costs when agent preferences 
deviate from principal preferences and when principals expend effort to 
monitor agents and mitigate their deviations.148 From an engineering 
perspective, these agency costs may be seen as another nonrandom bias, 
and thus redundancy is a potential response if agents differ with respect 
to agency costs.149 Given their divergent preferences, structures, and 
accountability mechanisms, agency relationships in public and private 
enforcement likely differ in ways that help harness the benefits of 
redundancy.150 
 Redundancy also has a dynamic effect on agency costs. One 
particular challenge for principals is monitoring agent performance. For 
example, it is difficult for Congress to know from the outside whether the 
EPA is doing a good job enforcing environmental law. Redundant 
delegations have the effect of producing information that permits 
principals to compare multiple diverse agents—Congress may be able to 
compare public and private outcomes to better assess performance.151 In 
this way, competition limits agency costs by making it cheaper for the 
lawmaker to monitor the agents. In addition, if agents are aware of this 
monitoring effect, redundancy should reduce deviations because agents 
are competing against each other in a more open fashion.152  
In short, although redundancy has direct costs and risks over-
enforcement, it also can be effective at fighting under-enforcement 
                                            
146 See supra note __. If information can be easily transferred among agents—e.g., 
if the government could require or cheaply induce a private party to share private 
information—then we might say that the information pools are not sufficiently different. 
147 Many sources identify private information as an advantage of private 
enforcement. See, e.g., Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note __; Burbank, et al., supra 
note __; Stephenson, Public Regulation, supra note __; Bucy, supra note __. But public 
enforcers may have informational advantages as well. See, e.g., Glover, supra note __ at 
1180 (suggested that public enforcement might be preferred for large datasets, 
comparative analyses, or complex facts). To give a simple example, a qui tam relator may 
have private information about a contractor’s fraudulent billing, while public attorneys 
may have an intimate knowledge of the government program. 
148 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
149 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
150 See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note __ (preferences); Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, 
supra note __ (structures); Stephenson, Public Regulation, supra note __ (accountability); 
Engstrom, supra note __ (accountability). 
151 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1971). 
152 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note __; Huq, supra note __.  
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resulting from errors, resource constraints, information problems, or 
agency costs if agents are sufficiently diverse. But this “pure engineering” 
can get us only so far. The redundant o-rings on a space shuttle are not 
strategic actors,153 so the insights from recent political-science literature 
are necessary to appreciate how these processes work in a world of 
strategic human actors. Particularly relevant here are two types of 
strategic behavior—“shirking” and “cue taking”—that have the potential 
to reduce the effectiveness of redundant systems.154 
Shirking is the risk that when a second agent is added, each agent 
will reduce its effort level because they are aware of the other player. For 
example, if information is endogenous—i.e., it is the result of agent effort 
in information gathering—the presence of a redundant agent might 
discourage that gathering effort.155 This collective-action problem should 
give pause to a lawmaker considering redundancy, particularly when the 
first agent is fairly reliable. That said, the political-science literature 
suggests that this concern is not always dispositive.156 First, the 
competitive redundancy described above with respect to agency costs cuts 
back on shirking when parties repeatedly compete over time.157 A 
government agency concerned about its budget, for example, will be less 
inclined to shirk if Congress is watching. Second, not all shirking is 
created equal. Political scientists suggest that the less reliable the 
original agent, the less her shirking actually hurts the principal’s 
interest.158 Particularly when a principal is saddled with an unreliable 
agent, the addition of a redundant enforcer can improve outcomes despite 
the risk of shirking. Third, the shirking problem assumes that the 
relevant pieces of information are substitutes, e.g., both agents are 
                                            
153 See, e.g., HEIMANN, supra note __. The physical failure of o-rings in the 
Challenger disaster was compounded by human error at a number of levels. Id. 
154 For an excellent summary of the relevant political-science literature on these 
issues, see HEIMANN, supra note __. 
155 For example, assume Agent 1 or Agent 2 is tasked with finding evidence to 
prosecute an environmental violator. If either agent is tasked with this duty alone, the 
assigned agent will expend a certain amount of effort on the task. But if Agents 1 and 2 
are given redundant responsibility, each one may offer less than full effort assuming that 
the other agent might pick up the slack. Further, if compensation is available only to the 
first agent to find the violation, then each agent in the redundant scenario will account 
for the reduced probability of compensation when choosing an effort level.  
156 See Ting, supra note __. The shirking story assumes a collective-action 
problem, but that is not preordained. Continuing the information example, information 
may be exogenous or differentially available. If the violation directly affects an individual, 
we would not suggest that this information was the product of her effort nor would we 
worry about other agents changing behavior in response. Shirking also is reduced if 
agents explicitly or implicitly coordinated, dividing the information space between them. 
157 See supra note __. 
158 See Ting, supra note __. 
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seeking to identify a single violation of law.159 But sometimes the relevant 
data will be complements, e.g., two pieces of information gain additional 
value when put together. In this circumstance, the incentives to gather 
each piece of information are increased rather than decreased.160  
A second strategic problem is cue taking. Nominally independent 
agents may change their behavior to mirror another agent’s actions, thus 
reducing the reliability-enhancing features of redundant components. 
This, too, is a potential concern for redundant enforcement.161 Here again, 
however, the political-science literature offers further clarity. First, 
interdependence can be avoided if agents are unaware of each other’s 
activities or are incentivized to ignore them.162 Indeed, the second agent 
may have the incentive to focus on exactly the areas that the first agent’s 
biases cause it to miss. Second, if the first agent is more reliable than the 
second, then the literature suggests that cue taking by the second, less 
reliable agent might be preferred—the less reliable agent does better 
when following the more reliable agent’s lead.163 And, if the cue giver 
knows about the cue taking behavior, then it can intentionally signal to 
the second agent to take actions that, for various reasons, the first agent 
prefers to hand off. For example, a resource strapped first agent can shift 
some of its burden to a less reliable second agent by cueing the work to be 
done.164 Last, with respect to either shirking or cue taking, strategic 
behavior can be understood as a cost, and sometimes that cost is worth 
paying in order to achieve the benefits of redundancy described here.  
The foregoing analysis suggests the following principles for 
structuring redundant-enforcement regimes: 
1. Redundancy creates direct costs and risks over-enforcement. (Many 
critics stop here.) 
2. However, redundancy may be a response to under-enforcement 
resulting from errors, resource constraints, information problems, 
and agency costs if agents are sufficiently differentiated. (This is 
the “engineering” claim.) 
                                            
159 See Stephenson, “Information Acquisition,” supra note __. 
160 See Ting, supra note __. 
161 One classic example of cue taking is that voters may make decisions about 
ballot initiatives based on the cues of interest groups and high profile individuals. See, 
e.g., Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in 
California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994). 
162 In other words, we can manipulate the system through incentives to return it 
to a state of independence. 
163 See HEIMANN, supra note __. 
164 One could imagine, for example, that more routine tasks can be delegated to 
the less reliable agent. Cf. HEIMANN, supra note __ (discussing programmatic functions). 
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3. Shirking may reduce redundancy’s effectiveness, though this 
concern is mitigated if the first agent is unreliable or if effort is 
complementary. Cue taking may reduce redundancy’s effectiveness, 
though this concern is mitigated if the first agent is reliable or if 
incentives are properly constructed to manage independence. 
(These are the strategic-behavior considerations.) 
By failing to move beyond the first principle, critics of redundancy miss 
the potential of multiple diverse agents to improve law enforcement. The 
“engineering” claim suggests many avenues for redundancy to respond to 
under-enforcement as along as agents are diverse and public and private 
agents likely differ along meaningful dimensions.165 The balance of this 
Part applies this general case for diverse-agent redundancy to problems 
with case selection and case outcomes. That said, the strategic-behavior 
concerns give some pause. Although this paper is not the forum for the 
fine-grained assessment necessary to apply those insights to specific 
areas, where relevant this Article will suggest how strategic behavior may 
affect the analysis under particular conditions. 
B. Redundant Authority and Case Selection 
As described above, under-enforcement may result from errors, 
resource constraints, information and perspectives, or agency costs. These 
issues can manifest in problems with case selection—agents may fail to 
bring cases they should. Or they may result in problems with case 
outcomes—settlements or judgments may understate the appropriate 
recovery. Potential responses differ when the target is case selection 
versus case outcomes.166 This Section considers case selection, leaving 
case outcomes to Section C.167 
The basic claim of this Section is that redundant authority, 
described as the ability of public and private agents to bring overlapping 
but mutually preclusive claims, responds to problems with case selection. 
The suggestion is that, despite costs, redundancy may be valuable in 
these circumstances because it helps with errors, resources, information, 
and agency costs while avoiding the direct costs of truly redundant 
litigation. The notion that redundant authority may reduce under-
selection of cases is not novel—indeed, the private-enforcement revolution 
                                            
165 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
166 Undifferentiated opposition to redundancy fails to appreciate this important 
distinction. See supra notes __. 
167 This Section thus assumes that once a case is selected by a public or private 
enforcer, the legislature is comfortable with potential outcomes. Why might a legislature 
worry about case selection and not case outcomes? Perhaps the legislature believes it is 
well positioned to monitor case prosecution, but lacks information necessary to monitor 
case selection. Or perhaps agent incentives differ with respect to case selection and 
prosecution such that under-selection is likely but under-performance in litigation is not.  
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assumed benefits from redundant authority.168 However, it is useful to 
articulate the logic of redundant authority both to see its scope and to 
identify the procedural rules that should structure its use. It is also 
important to differentiate between redundant authority and redundant 
litigation, and the different circumstances that justify those approaches. 
First, some cases may go unselected because of random or non-
random errors. The pure engineering version of redundancy suggests that 
redundant authority should reduce either type of under-enforcement.169 
Admittedly, in some circumstances the lawmaker may be able to improve 
enforcement without redundancy by targeting agent incentives—
providing bounties,170 increasing the attorney fee,171 or raising the 
political profile of an issue often will be sufficient.172 But in some 
circumstances the legislature will be unable to tailor the incentives to 
satisfy public or private attorneys,173 and in those situations, redundant 
authority can improve enforcement through diversification. And because 
case selection is the issue here, redundant authority should be combined 
with preclusion to avoid costly (and unnecessary) relitigation. Note also 
that preclusion avoids the cue-taking problem because once a case is 
selected, there is no cue to take.174 
Second, non-selection of cases may result from resource 
constraints. Because public and private enforcers draw on different 
resource pools, redundant authority should mitigate this under-selection 
by increasing available resources as compared with public or private 
authority alone.175 Indeed, existing redundant-authority regimes are often 
justified on this basis.176 For example, the SEC has acknowledged that 
private enforcement provides a necessary supplement to public securities 
enforcement.177 When Congress first adopted private rights of action for 
                                            
168 See supra notes __ and accompanying text (collecting examples).  
169 Random errors are avoided by repetition; bias is counteracted by multiple 
diverse agents (with diverse biases). See supra notes __. 
170 See, e.g., supra note __ (citing False Claims Act recovery provisions). 
171 See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note __ (collecting examples). 
172 See supra note __ and accompanying text (public and private preferences), 
173 For example, Professor Weisbach noted that legislatures are disabled from 
using high-powered incentives for government attorneys. See Weisbach, supra note __. 
For profit-motivated parties, due-process caps as well as available remedial metrics may 
limit potential recoveries. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) 
(limiting punitive damages). Defendant’s ability to pay also may blunt private incentives.  
174 See supra note __. 
175 This assumes that resources are exogenous, at least for public actors, if not for 
private ones as well. The exogeneity of resources mitigates the shirking problem. See 
supra note __. 
176 See supra note __ (defining preclusion to include any rule that cuts off 
redundant litigation). 
177 See supra note __ (citing testimony of Chairman Levitt). 
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antitrust violations, the appropriation for federal antitrust enforcement 
was zero.178 Notably, although redundant authority may increase 
resources, converting redundant authority to redundant litigation may be 
counterproductive on this score—duplication will sap already scarce 
enforcement resources. For this reason, inter-party preclusion is 
particularly important in these cases.179  
Information presents a third challenge to case selection, and again 
redundant authority may be helpful while redundant litigation may go too 
far. The potential information challenge is straightforward—the party 
who can most efficiently prosecute the case may not know that it exists (or 
that it is cost effective). Redundancy, properly constructed, responds to 
this information problem: redundant authority permits either agent to file 
a case; claims-processing rules publicize and allocate cases; and 
preclusion stems over-selection. In light of the potential for shirking, 
these regimes are particularly apt when agents have differential access to 
information, reducing incentives to shirk and increasing the possibility of 
complementary efforts.180 Whistleblower regimes also may be employed to 
solve information problems, though redundant authority may be preferred 
because it incentivizes parties to bring cases and it insures against non-
selection by the other agent.181 
One potential example of this approach is the notice-and-
intervention scheme of environmental statutes.182 Private parties may 
                                            
178 See Krent Roach & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition 
Laws, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 461, 465 (1996). 
179 But see supra notes __ (discussing examples of non-preclusion). Further, 
because the target is limited resources, claims-processing rules in these regimes should 
allocate cases between public and private enforcers with an emphasis on opportunity 
costs. For example, Congress might give private parties first priority, assuming that 
public resources should be reserved for cases that lack a private option. 
180 If Agent 1 knows that Agent 2 cannot access information (or cannot gather it 
at a reasonable cost), then Agent 1 should not alter its behavior because of Agent 2. See 
supra note __. Similarly, intangible resources often are complementary, for example 
private information about harms and expertise at prosecuting them. See supra note __. 
181 Although whistleblower regimes also could include incentives, the private-
enforcement model represents an existing tool to incentivize private parties (damages) 
and attorneys (fees). Cf. Huq, supra note __ (discussing cost mitigation resulting from the 
use of existing institutions). And litigation has the added benefit of deterring some bad 
cases, as the costs of filing suit and the threat of sanctions (or worse) may act as a 
screening mechanism for misleading or false allegations. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & 
Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam (forthcoming). 
Litigation may have other advantages as well. For example, litigation may smooth the 
information-sharing process, either because courts can endorse (and enforce) protective 
orders among parties, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), or because courts can require information 
sharing even when parties are otherwise reluctant. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. At the same 
time, civil litigation is replete with claims-processing procedures that can be used to 
ensure the priority enforcer litigates first. See supra notes __. 
182 See supra notes __ and accompany text (discussing citizen suits). 
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have better information than the EPA about where and when 
environmental violations occur.183 As a result, private parties are 
permitted to bring citizen suits.184 But, Congress has indicated a 
preference for government enforcement: a claims-processing rule requires 
the private party to give notice to the government, and the government 
has the option to intervene and preclude private action.185 If the 
government does not intervene, however, private litigation provides 
insurance against the government’s non-selection.186  
Agency costs are a final explanation for selection problems. For 
example, a government agency may be the most efficient enforcer, but 
because of capture, it would prefer not to prosecute an offending 
insider.187 However, if case-selection decisions were easy to monitor, then 
in some of these situations, the agency will prefer to prosecute the suit 
itself. Redundant authority thus responds to agency problems by 
announcing good cases to agents and principals.188 And, because agents 
are in competition, these effects should feed back on selection decisions 
and (again because of competition) should be less susceptible to shirking 
and cue taking.189  
The qui tam mechanism in the False Claims Act may track these 
informational and agency-costs stories.190 Sometimes the government will 
have the information and the will to prosecute, and in those cases the 
                                            
183 Most obviously, a direct victim of an environmental violation may be the first 
to learn of it, and indeed citizen-suit plaintiffs must show an “injury in fact” to have 
standing. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). “Original sources” 
of information are prioritized in False Claims Act cases as well. See infra note __. Note 
that this situation also tracks the observation that redundant authority is particularly 
helpful when agents have different access to information. See supra note __. 
184 See supra note __ (discussing citizen suits). 
185 See supra notes __ (citing intervention and preclusion provisions). Perhaps 
this preference responds to the EPA’s prosecutorial expertise. And, indeed, it may be that 
private information and government expertise are complementary. See supra note __. 
186 For example, if the EPA declined to prosecute due to bias, resources, or agency 
costs, the backstop of private enforcement does the job.  
187 This is an extreme version of Professor Cover’s concern with ideological 
commitments. See Cover, supra note __. 
188 Professor Stephenson argued that executive agencies should determine when 
to allow private rights of action. See Stephenson, Public Regulation, supra note __. But 
his proposal is susceptible to an agency-capture critique. Legislative, judicial, or market-
based approaches reduce the effect of agency capture because the public enforcer is 
cooperating or competing with the private enforcer in the light of day.  
189 See supra notes __. Redundant authority may improve enforcement efficiency 
as well. Agents may select weak cases if they are unaware of strong cases—an 
information problem. Or, they may take weak cases to hide strong cases that they would 
rather not prosecute—an agency problem. Redundant authority can improve case-
selection efficacy by publicizing strong cases and reducing monitoring costs.  
190 See supra notes __. The False Claims Act also might respond to resource 
constraints, as the government may not be able to prosecute all of the fraud against it. 
 
 
 
28 
government may bring an enforcement action that precludes further 
private efforts.191 In other cases, government agents may not be aware of 
the fraud or may be complicit in it, so private parties may initiate suits.192 
Public enforcers, well versed in government litigation, may intervene once 
the case is announced by the private enforcer.193 Redundant litigation in 
either case is avoided as public and private suits are mutually 
preclusive.194 
To summarize, redundant authority may improve case selection by 
reducing errors, aggregating resources and information, and improving 
monitoring. This logic supports redundant authority but not redundant 
litigation. Preclusion should bar duplicative suits in these circumstances, 
and claims-processing rules should be targeted to the particular 
challenges in the regulated area. Cue taking is not a significant issue 
here, while the risk of shirking points to certain circumstances 
particularly well suited for redundant authority. 
C. Redundant Litigation and Case Outcomes 
Because redundant authority avoids much of the waste and over-
enforcement risk that comes from truly redundant litigation, the case for 
redundant authority may seem straightforward. In many circumstances, 
diversifying potential enforcers has positive consequences for enforcement 
levels, while the costs of this redundancy—though not nonexistent—are 
much lower. Therefore, it may not be surprising that redundant authority 
is a relatively common regulatory strategy, and that its adoption is open 
and notorious.195 
The costs are clearly higher in redundant litigation. Two lawsuits 
are more costly than one, and the risks of over-enforcement are higher 
when plaintiffs get two bites at the apple. Therefore, it may not be 
surprising that redundant litigation is more frequently the subject of 
criticism, and that its uses documented in Part II are perhaps less obvious 
to outside observers. Indeed, a default preference against redundant 
litigation would not be unjustified. 
                                            
191 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a). 
192 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). Indeed, private suits must provide non-public 
information—the relator must satisfy the “public-disclosure bar” or be an “original 
source.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). This might be seen as cue giving from the more reliable 
agent. See supra note __. 
193 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) & (c). 
194 See supra note __. Private incentives are maintained independent of the 
government’s intervention decision. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (providing award of 15 to 25 
percent if the government intervenes, or 25 to 30 percent if the government does not). 
195 Environmental citizen suits, for example, should not surprise most observers 
of environmental law. 
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And yet, if lawmakers are concerned with settlements and 
judgments that understate the appropriate level of enforcement, 
redundant authority is insufficient. Denying inter-party preclusion may 
remedy and deter under-enforcement in case outcomes, and damages and 
claims-processing rules can minimize some costs of over-enforcement and 
waste, though again these costs remain an important consideration for 
enforcement design. The balance of this Section unpacks these ideas, 
moving stepwise through the procedural decisions that manage redundant 
litigation: (1) preclusion; (2) damages; and (3) claims processing. 
Before delving into this analysis, though, there is one explanation 
for redundant litigation that should be mentioned. Perhaps the easiest 
case for redundant litigation exists when the lawmaker accepts the risk of 
over-enforcement in service of reducing under-enforcement.196 It may be 
that for certain conduct, the lawmaker is so intent on punishment and 
deterrence that it tolerates over-enforcement.197 Or it may be that the 
lawmaker assumes (rightly or wrongly) that agents will self-censor over-
enforcement.198 Either way, if the goal is a reduction in under-
enforcement no matter the cost—and as long as constitutional protections 
are in place199—then the legislature could authorize redundant litigation 
purely as insurance against false negatives. However, concerns with over-
enforcement are legitimate,200 and “multiple punishments” should not be 
the norm.201 For these reasons, the balance of this Section assumes that 
lawmakers are not unconcerned with over-enforcement.202 
1. Preclusion: Redundant Authority v. Redundant Litigation 
Case outcomes may be insufficient for many of the same reasons 
that good cases may not be selected. Agents may make random errors or 
biased ones. Resource constraints may reduce the effectiveness of 
                                            
196 Bendor, for example, suggests that the justification for redundancy is stronger 
“the more critical or costly a failure would be.” BENDOR, supra note __. 
197 For two sources discussing but not endorsing this notion, see Huq, supra note 
__ (discussing terrorism), and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for 
Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008) (discussing constitutional rights). 
198 Perhaps agents are so concerned with legislative approval—and legislatures 
are so transparent about their concern with over-enforcement—that the risk is small. Or 
perhaps the legislature concludes that norms sufficiently discourage duplicative suits.  
199 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (limiting 
permissible punitive damages); U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (Excessive Fines Clause). 
200 Cf. infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing Shady Grove). 
201 See infra note __ (citing sources on multiple punishments).  
202 Although the lawmaker may not want to encourage over-enforcement, 
presumably most laws are designed to be enforced once. For example, a statutory or 
common-law claim for compensatory damages seeks to make the victim whole. One might 
say that there are statutory schemes for which under-enforcement is preferred, e.g., speed 
limits, but recall that this Article judges enforcement against legislative preference, so 
those cases merely suggest a different baseline. See supra note __. 
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enforcement operations. Information gaps may lead enforcers to 
underperform at settlement or judgment. And agency problems may 
result in sham suits or suboptimal settlements. 
Redundant authority does not respond to problems with case 
outcomes, but redundant litigation might. The mechanism is direct: 
remove preclusion. If a private suit understates recovery, then a second 
(non-precluded) public suit is available to remedy the under-enforcement; 
if a public suit is insufficient, a second (non-precluded) private suit could 
fill the gap.203 The second litigation also aggregates information exposed 
in the first case with new information from the redundant agent—efforts 
may be complementary.204 And, by improving monitoring through 
competition and publicity, redundant suits curtail agency problems.205 
The threat of redundant litigation also should feed back into improved 
outcomes in the first case, and thus it may reduce the amount of 
redundant litigation that actually occurs.206 Though redundant litigation 
has direct costs, a legislature may elect to pay these costs in order to 
remedy and deter under-enforcement in case outcomes.207 
Why would a legislature elect redundant litigation when it could 
just select the better enforcer? One set of answers is that the better 
enforcer cannot be stretched to cover all cases. Most clearly, the better 
enforcer may be hard capped by resource constraints—states with 
balanced-budget requirements, for example, can only increase public-
enforcement spending so much. This hard-capped constraint has parallels 
in other areas—e.g., there may be something about the better agent that 
makes it impossible (or impractical) to overcome a particular bias or 
information problem. In these circumstances, redundant litigation may 
provide a backstop for under-enforcing outcomes.208 
Perhaps a more interesting set of answers tracks the earlier 
observation that redundancy is particularly effective when the principal is 
saddled with an unreliable enforcer.209 In those cases, allowing a second 
                                            
203 Non-preclusion may reduce defendants’ incentives to settle. Because remedies 
are critical to this analysis, this issue is taken up in the discussion of damages below. 
204 In this way, concern with shirking may be mitigated. See supra note __. 
205 Publicity is relevant not only to inform legislatures about agent performance, 
but also to inform voters about legislative performance. 
206 This is a positive type of strategic behavior. See supra notes __. 
207 Moreover, note that many of the costs of litigation do not need to be 
duplicated. For example, the costs of preservation and discovery may not be incurred 
twice. And, as it turns out, these costs seem to represent the largest share of litigation 
spending. See, e.g., William H.J. Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero (forthcoming). Costs 
also are mitigated by the capacity for litigation among private parties, public enforcers, 
and the courts. See Huq, supra note __ (discussing related issue). 
208 See supra Section III.A. 
209 See supra note __. 
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agent to sue may fill the gap. For example, for claims that have some 
“private” character—e.g., torts—a legislature may be unwilling or unable 
to eliminate private enforcement.210 And yet, for various reasons, private 
actions may be systematically suboptimal. Thus, redundant government 
litigation may be necessary to achieve socially optimal outcomes. 
Consider the case of private mass litigation. Suboptimal 
settlements are a notorious concern in class actions. The notion is that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys have incentives to settle cases too easily; plaintiffs 
themselves are poor monitors because individual stakes are low and 
information is expensive; and courts supervising litigation are 
handicapped because they only have information presented to them by the 
parties.211 This problem is magnified in the context of dueling class 
actions.212 If class actions are filed in different jurisdictions, defendants 
can hold a reverse auction among plaintiffs’ attorneys, bidding them down 
to lower and lower settlements.213 Each class counsel is willing to 
negotiate because she wants her fee, and full-faith-and-credit rules mean 
that any judicially endorsed settlement may be preclusive in other U.S. 
courts.214 If the private settlement were not preclusive on government 
suits, then redundant public litigation could improve the outcome and 
mitigate the reverse-auction problem. The threat of a redundant suit also 
may have a disciplining effect on the original settlement.215 
A number of recent developments in complex-dispute resolution 
may call out for redundant public enforcement of this type. Private 
entities (like British Petroleum after Deep Water Horizon) have employed 
                                            
210 See supra notes __. Non-tort claims may also have a personal connection. A 
district court recently certified an antitrust class action on behalf of women who donated 
eggs through fertility clinics and donation agencies. Kamakahi v. Am. Soc. Reproductive 
Med., No 11-cv-01781 (Feb. 3, 2015, N.D. Cal.). “Private” claims also may include those 
for which the private party has a nonpecuniary interest. For further discussion of the 
implications of these values for redundant enforcement, see infra note __. 
211 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995) (hereinafter “Coffee, Class Wars”); Susan P. 
Koniak, Feasting While the Widows Weep: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of 
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
212 See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2000). 
213 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New 
Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (1995); Wasserman, supra note __. 
214 See U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); 28 USC § 1738 (full 
faith and credit statute). See also supra note __ (collecting sources). 
215 Allowing serial private suits is another possible response, and indeed this was 
the state of affairs with respect to damages class actions prior to 1966. See, e.g., Geoffrey 
C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the Binding 
Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998). But such an approach risks over-
enforcement, cf. Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard 
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957), and reduced incentives to settle. See infra notes __. 
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so-called “corporate settlement mills” to privately resolve disputes and 
procure litigation waivers without resort to the legal process.216 In a novel 
settlement agreement, parties to a class action applied mandatory class 
procedures to an agreement waiving the right to future class relief, while 
leaving open the possibility of future individual suits.217 Arbitration is yet 
another potential intervener, as enforceable class-arbitration waivers 
have drawn skepticism from many judges and scholars.218 In each of these 
circumstances, a legislature may not object to the new practice in theory, 
but may worry about its effect on case outcomes. Instead of banning the 
practice outright, a legislature could adopt non-preclusion to remedy or 
deter any under-enforcing outcomes that may result.219 
Still another version of this account of redundant litigation 
addresses situations in which reliability varies across cases. Imagine a 
government agency that is a reasonably reliable enforcer except that it 
occasionally settles suboptimally with political allies (or as a result of 
some other nonrandom bias). On this set of facts, the lawmaker is—in a 
sense—saddled with an unreliable enforcer for those few cases if it wants 
to preserve the reliable enforcer for all other cases.220 Redundant 
litigation can be available for these suboptimal outcomes,221 and the 
threat of redundant litigation—and its ability to publicize and 
substantiate those suboptimal outcomes—may have a feedback effect on 
the agency’s behavior.222 
                                            
216 See Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 
101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming). Remus and Zimmerman propose regulation, judicial 
scrutiny, participation, and ethical standards, but another response would be permitting 
redundant government litigation. 
217 See D. Theodore Rave, When Peace Is Not the Goal of a Class Action Settlement 
(citing In re Trans Union Corporation Privacy Litigation, 741 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 2014)). 
The District Court approved a settlement agreement using the mandatory aggregation 
procedure of Rule 23(b)(1)(A), under which defendant offered some relief in exchange for 
waivers of the right to proceed in an “aggregated action.” The agreement did not seem to 
bar parens patriae actions on the same claims. 
218 E.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011). 
219 This proposal would be particularly effective if combined with a setoff rule, 
such that the threat of relitigation would deter the most egregious versions of these 
practices but not deter their use entirely. See infra Section III.C.2. 
220 This assumes that the lawmaker cannot identify these cases ex ante and 
legislate accordingly. For example, if we knew that the EPA had a problem with clean 
water cases, we could strip its jurisdiction in that area only. 
221 See supra note __ (discussing “diligent prosecution” requirements). 
222 Of course, reliability may vary between public and private agents, and there 
are practical and democratic-theory differences between public and private enforcers. See, 
e.g., Stephenson, Public Regulation, supra note __; Engstrom, supra note __. For these 
reasons, legislatures may adopt asymmetric preclusion rules. See supra notes __ 
(collecting statutes with asymmetric preclusion). For example, if a legislature concluded 
that public enforcement was more reliable, government outcomes could preclude private 
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Finally, redundant litigation could target cases based on 
disposition type. Specifically, a legislature may think differently about the 
reliability of settlements versus judgments. As noted above, under-
enforcing settlements are a significant problem in class actions. There 
also are good reasons to be concerned about public settlements that cut off 
further investigation.223 In the language of strategic behavior, the risk of 
shirking may be magnified in settlement cases.224 These concerns may 
support a non-preclusion rule for settlements. Agency problems seem less 
severe in cases litigated to judgment. Courts actively supervise litigants 
and attorneys, opportunities to collude are reduced, and the public nature 
of judicial proceedings compared with settlements should create some 
sunlight-as-disinfectant effects.225 Under-enforcing judgments may be a 
problem, but it would not be unreasonable for a legislature to be less 
concerned than when cases settle.226 Therefore, settlements could be 
denied preclusive effect while relitigation of judgments would only be 
permitted if a high bar is cleared.227 
This differentiation between the preclusive effect of settlements 
and judgments reflects what might be called contingent delegation. If an 
agent is willing to litigate cases, incur those costs, and subject itself to the 
scrutiny of the judicial process, then the lawmaker devolves significant 
authority. The litigating agent has full control unless its performance is so 
poor that it is susceptible to a collateral attack.228 If parties settle cases, 
                                                                                                                       
litigants asymmetrically. Less drastically, relative preclusion could vary depending on 
party order—i.e., it is harder, but not impossible, to relitigate a government case. 
223 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note __ (discussing criticisms of EPA intervention). 
224 See supra note __ 
225 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (judicial supervision of class-action representation). 
226 One potentially relevant consideration is that redundancy might affect fact-
finder behavior—it might increase errors in favor of defendants or discourage investment 
of judicial resources in light of the potential backstop. See, e.g., Huq, supra note __; 
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011) (showing how second-round 
review affects judicial behavior in the first case); Rosenberg, supra note __ (discussing 
adjudicative investment as a function of stakes). Exactly how these effects may play out 
in redundant enforcement is not clear, and the presence of government actors may 
complicate matters further. These effects thus deserve further study. 
227 Cf. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note __ (discussing class actions and 
parens patriae suits); William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons 
from Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 790, 820-41 (2007) (discussing habeas cases and class 
actions); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in 
Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998). Writing 
about public suits vindicating private claims, Professor Lemos rejected preclusion in favor 
of offset or opt-in. See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note __. Lemos’s arguments 
apparently apply to settlements and judgments, but the logic described here suggests that 
judgments could be treated more respectfully (and more preclusively) than settlements. 
228 Note that preclusion attaches to claims actually litigated, so governmental 
under-claiming would not preclude private suits on claims not raised in the first action. 
Cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17 & 27.  
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however, the delegation is weaker—no preclusion attaches. The relative 
strength of the contingent delegation (i.e., the relative strength of 
preclusion) is at the discretion of the legislature.229 And, redundant 
enforcement may reveal information about public and private enforcers 
that informs future contingent delegations. 
2. Damages: Multiple Punishments and Incentives 
This Section makes a simple claim—damages in redundant 
litigation should offset to reduce over-enforcement—and then considers 
various implications of this proposal. 
As explained above, legislatures may be justified in turning to 
redundant public-private litigation to reduce under-enforcement in case 
outcomes. Adopting a non-preclusion rule, however, risks over-
enforcement in the form of multiple recoveries. If both private and public 
enforcers can sue on the same offense, defendants could easily pay twice. 
This is the “multiple punishments problem.”230 A direct solution is to 
require that damages in the second case be offset by the value of the first 
recovery. That way, a defendant should never pay more than full value. In 
practice, pairing offset with non-preclusion is common in public-private 
litigation, though it is not the universal rule, and the lack of offsets in 
some areas should raise red flags.231 
Note that this seemingly straightforward rejection of multiple 
damages has implications for alternative strategies to remedy under-
enforcement in case outcomes. One potential response to under-enforcing 
outcomes would be to multiply damages—if parties routinely accept one 
                                            
229 Potential standards could include rules borrowed from legal malpractice, Gunn 
v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (discussing Texas law); ineffective assistance of 
counsel in habeas cases, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); or 
inadequate representation in class-action jurisprudence. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 395-
99 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also supra note __ 
(collecting sources). 
230 See, e.g., Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a 
National Punitive Damages Registry, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1613 (2005); Thomas B. Colby, 
Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for 
Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive 
Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003); Howard A. Denemark, Seeking 
Greater Fairness when Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by 
a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 931 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and 
Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925 (2002). See 
also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.). 
231 See supra notes __ (collecting examples in securities, antitrust, and ERISA). In 
many areas, public and private damages are described differently—e.g., private litigants 
may be able to recover punitive damages while public litigants recover civil penalties. The 
mere re-characterization of damages theories should not interfere with the offset regime. 
Only if damages truly seek different ends, should offset be reconsidered. 
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half of the optimum, a legislature could prescribe double damages.232 The 
treble-damages provisions in antitrust laws, for example, may be 
pursuing this approach, which has the advantage of not requiring two 
suits to achieve the increased recovery.233 That said, the multiple-
punishments problem highlights reasons to favor redundant litigation 
over damage multipliers. First, although a damage multiplier might on 
average result in optimum recovery, in any given case a defendant might 
pay too much. For fairness reasons, these multiple punishments may be 
disfavored.234 The risk of multiple damages also may disproportionately 
affect risk-averse parties, while they will be ineffective against parties 
with a limited ability to pay.235 Finally, multiplied damages may not be 
effective in response to many of the enforcement problems identified 
above—a truly captured agency, an enforcer with a fixed resource 
constraint, or a case involving difficult-to-transfer knowledge may still 
call out for multiple diverse agents rather than a multiplier.236 
Returning to the main thread, the simple claim that offsets avoid 
multiple damages must grapple with the potential consequences for the 
likelihood of redundant suits. Redundant litigation options cannot deter 
or remedy under-enforcement if they are never cost-effective to exercise.237 
Offset thus presents an incentive problem: whichever agent goes second 
will be pursuing a reduced opportunity for damages,238 and this reduction 
in incentives could result in non-selection or under-investment.239 
With respect to government attorneys as redundant enforcers, the 
reduction in the purely pecuniary incentives to litigate should be less 
troubling. Public attorneys have motives beyond monetary recovery.240 If 
one subscribes to a budget-maximizing view of public agencies, then it 
would make sense for government attorneys to demonstrate the 
shortcomings of private enforcement in order to acquire more resources in 
                                            
232 This is obviously an oversimplification, as one would expect dynamic effects 
resulting from a damage multiplier that may require a different ratio. However, the logic 
of this discussion holds no matter the proportions used here. 
233 See supra note __. 
234 See supra note __ (collecting sources). Indeed, in some areas, the Supreme 
Court has disallowed multiple punishments on constitutional grounds. See supra note __. 
235 If a party had funds to pay a compensatory award but not a multiplied one, 
then it would not experience any greater deterrent effect from the multiplier. 
236 See supra Section III.A. 
237 It was a related worry about cost effectiveness that spurred the creation of opt-
out class actions. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967). 
238 Assuming multiple recoveries were disfavored, this is another reason to doubt 
serial private litigation as a policy response. See supra note __. 
239 Assuming multiple recoveries were disfavored, this is another reason to doubt 
serial private litigation as a policy response. See supra note __. 
240 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
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the next round of legislation.241 Alternatively, if public attorneys were 
public spirited (or public-attention seeking), miscarriages of justice may 
call out for action. These same interests also may discourage public actors 
from relitigating cases in which prior outcomes were only slightly 
suboptimal. It would be hard to imagine a legislature responding 
positively to an agency that used valuable resources to recover a pittance, 
nor would such a suit maximize the public interest.242 
The incentive problem is more acute when private actors are 
redundant enforcers. Private parties seem primarily motivated in these 
cases by profit,243 and private parties necessarily will have reduced 
incentives in offset cases as compared with non-offset cases. If the 
legislature ranks cases according to potential recovery, then this 
reduction in incentives is appropriate—private parties will sue only when 
government underperformance is so extensive that it would be cost 
justified to bring a redundant suit to recover the remainder. If lawmakers 
want the disciplining effect of redundant litigation to reach beyond those 
cases, however, then they would need to construct incentives to encourage 
follow-on suits. Attorney fees are an obvious starting point.244 For 
redundant suits, lawmakers could offer attorney fees calculated with 
reference to the pre-offset value.245 To avoid private attorneys filing 
nearly frivolous suits in order to rack up attorney fees,246 the legislature 
could limit the availability of fees to significant recoveries.247 One could 
characterize this proposal as contingent procurement—the government is 
                                            
241 See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1971); Gersen, supra note __.  
242 See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” 
Settlements in Class Action: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000) 
(discussing the consequences of asymmetric stakes for accuracy). Of course, the 
asymmetric stakes between private plaintiffs and defendants in mass actions are 
notorious. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 
UCLA L. REV. 1494 (2013); Hay & Rosenberg, supra. 
243 See supra note __. 
244 See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note __ (collecting data on fee provisions).  
245 For example, if a set of claims were worth $10 million plus a $2 million 
attorney fee, and the government settled the parens patriae case for $5 million, a private 
attorney obtaining $5 million in additional recovery could be entitled to the same $2 
million fee. Legislatures may view this as unfair to defendants and as creating a 
disincentive for government attorneys to achieve maximum settlements. A solution to 
both problems would require defendants to satisfy the difference in damages and the 
government to reimburse the attorney fee.  
246 See supra note __ (discussing an antitrust suit seeking zero-dollar recovery in 
order to qualify for an attorney-fee award). 
247 For example, the attorney may only recover if damages exceed the fee, some 
multiple of the fee, or some fixed amount. To avoid inflection points, perhaps the attorney 
fee should grow in proportion to the difference between the private result and the offset. 
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procuring substitute representation only if the private party achieves a 
certain level of recovery.248 
Importantly, though, increasing the incentives to relitigate comes 
at a cost to settlement. If settlements are not preclusive, and if 
relitigation is likely, defendants may be reluctant to settle in the first 
place. The uncertainty of follow-on litigation undercuts the finality of 
settlement,249 and defendants may worry about the signal that settlement 
sends to future enforcers.250 Lawmakers must be aware of this tradeoff 
when considering redundant litigation.251 That said, settlement effects 
should not be overstated. The incentives to settle are already quite 
strong,252 and parties settle even if general releases are not available.253 
Moreover, offset provisions should help to reduce settlement effects 
because they link the risk of relitigation to the adequacy of the 
settlement. Defendants’ incentive to settle will be most disturbed when 
settlement values are most troubling from a social perspective.254  
In sum, when adopting redundant public-private litigation, 
lawmakers can curtail over-enforcement by offsetting damages in the 
redundant case, though incentives may need attention to ensure that 
useful disciplining litigation remains cost effective.255 
                                            
248 If the redundant litigation follow a government judgment, different rules may 
be necessary. Perhaps private parties could be required to bring the underlying claim 
against the defendant and also argue inadequate representation, or they could have a 
takings-like claim against the government agency that failed them. It seems likely that a 
legislature would reject a rule in which the government could be liable for the full value of 
every claim it loses. But it would not be so unreasonable to provide restitution in those 
cases in which the government grossly underperformed. 
249 See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of 
the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003). 
250 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default 
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006). 
251 For example, lawmakers especially concerned with settlement effects could 
give defendants the protection of a fee-shifting provision tied to the redundant recovery. 
252 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 410 
(2004) (suggesting that 98 percent of cases settle). Although this 98-percent figure 
overstates the case, see, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the 
Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 111 (2009), there is no 
doubt that a substantial number of civil cases settle. 
253 Defendants settle antitrust and securities cases with government regulators 
even in light of follow-on private suits. And the notorious difficulty of enforcing releases 
has not deterred settlements in the vast majority of cases. 
254 For this reason, it also should not be unfair to deprive defendants of the 
preclusive benefits of an illegitimate first disposition. See supra Section III.C.1. 
255 The discussion here has focused on damages cases, but of course enforcement 
suits may seek declaratory or injunctive relief. One need look no further than the classics 
of public-law litigation—e.g., Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1944); Abram Chayes, 
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976)—to see that 
declaratory and injunctive relief should not be ignored. One simple way to translate this 
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3. Claims Processing: Order and Timing 
The foregoing discussion has assumed sequential enforcement, but 
public and private suits may be litigated simultaneously. Simultaneous 
suits risk duplicative work and lose out on beneficial aggregation. 
Simultaneous suits also risk shirking, as both agents will prefer that the 
other makes costly investments in research. Finally, if simultaneous 
litigation creates a race, it may discourage enforcers from sharing 
information, while encouraging them to cut corners, strike sweetheart 
deals, or engage in inefficient gamesmanship.256  
Legislatures may respond to these concerns by turning 
simultaneous enforcement actions into sequential ones. Claims-processing 
rules have the power to affect litigation timing. The simplest version is a 
stay rule: all suits except one are stayed pending its outcome.257 To ensure 
that parties and courts are aware of simultaneous suits, parties could be 
required to give notice of potentially redundant litigation.258 Citizen-suit 
provisions, for example, often call upon private parties to notify the 
government of their suits.259 Another way to reduce waste is to limit the 
time in which overlapping claims can be brought. For example, private 
actors could have the option to intervene as co-plaintiffs or to replace a 
public enforcer only at the outset of litigation.260 And courts have various 
                                                                                                                       
Section’s recommendation to equity is to adopt its approach to preclusion rules, ignore 
offset rules (because there are no damages to offset), and turn directly to claims 
processing. Another view might be that governments never should be precluded from 
pursuing injunctive relief. A middle ground applies the former recommendation to private 
claims and the latter to public claims. And in some injunctive cases, remedies may be 
additive such that “offset” could apply. 
256 Cf. Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the 
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971). These effects should exist 
whether the first suit precludes or offsets the second. 
The discussion here is simplified in that it assumes one public and one private 
enforcer. Of course, federal and state governments also may have overlapping claims, and 
multiple state governments may want a piece of the action. This paper takes no position 
on these questions. Instead, the focus here is how legislatures may tap public and private 
enforcers to improve law enforcement through redundant public-private action. 
257 Some statutes include stay provisions, see supra notes __, and legislatures 
could take advantage of existing judicial tools for managing parallel proceedings. 
258 See supra note __ and accompanying text (discussing notice provisions). 
259 See supra note __ and accompanying text. Similar provisions could exist in 
other statutory contexts and in either direction. Cf. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra 
note __ (proposing notice and opt-out for private parties in government suits). 
260 Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (permitting government intervention in False 
Claims Act suit within 60 days); 47 U.S.C. § 402 (permitting any interested party to 
intervene in judicial review of FCC decision within 30 days).  
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capabilities that can improve coordination between seemingly separate 
proceedings.261 
Whether the government suit should stay the private suit or vice 
versa is an important choice.262 The strategic-behavior considerations 
described above are particularly relevant to this claims-processing issue. 
Recall that cue-taking may be a good thing if the reliable agent cues the 
less-reliable one.263 The legislature may well conclude that the 
government enforcer is more reliable but lacks the resources to prosecute 
every case vigorously.264 If the government is allowed to move first but 
calibrate its effort, this action can signal to follow-on private enforcers 
that further work is necessary. For example, the government could pursue 
injunctive relief or liability only, thereby cueing private enforcers to take 
up damages actions. Indeed, in some areas, a finding of liability in a 
government enforcement action is prima facie evidence of a violation in 
the follow-on private suit,265 and in others government litigation 
automatically stays the statute of limitations for redundant private 
litigation.266 Alternatively, if redundant litigation is only necessary to cure 
occasional lapses by the public (or private) enforcer, then public (or 
private) suits should go first.267 
An additional consideration with respect to party ordering is 
compensation. The multiple punishments literature worries about 
defendants unfairly paying multiple judgments, but it often ignores the 
issue of compensation—which of the many potential plaintiffs collects the 
damage award, and why are others barred from recovery?268 In an offset 
regime, the party suing first has access to the largest potential recovery. A 
                                            
261 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.) § 22.2 (“Courts routinely 
order counsel to disclose, on an ongoing basis past, and pending related cases in state and 
federal courts and to report on their status and results.”); Clopton, supra note __ 
(discussing coordination in transnational litigation). 
262 Particular circumstances also may call for more creative solutions such as 
auctions or tournaments. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note __.  
263 See supra notes __. 
264 See supra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing this justification). 
265 See supra note __.  
266 See supra note __.  
267 See supra notes __ and accompanying text (outlining this justification for 
redundant litigation). 
268 See supra note __ (collecting sources). Professor Sharkey, a notable objector to 
this trend, identified a particularly telling passage from a law-and-economics textbook: 
“[T]hat the damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from an economic standpoint, a detail. It 
is payment by the defendant that creates incentives for more efficient resource use. The 
transfer of the money to the plaintiff affects his wealth but does not affect efficiency or 
value.” Sharkey, supra note __ (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
78 (1972)). Another response would be to decouple the award to plaintiff from the 
payment by defendant. E.g., David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation 
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002). 
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legislature allowing government litigation to proceed first must be 
comfortable with reducing potential private compensation, or it must 
come up with another way to compensate.269 If private litigation goes first, 
however, private plaintiffs have an opportunity at full recovery. This 
option could be understood as forfeiting further compensation from the 
government litigation.270 
Non-monetary values such as dignity and participation are also 
relevant to claim ordering.271 Though much of this Article is framed in 
instrumentalist terms, particularly for “private law” claims, there are 
reasons to think that an aggrieved party should have the right to an 
individual day in court against a defendant that did her wrong.272 These 
values may suggest that a private party should have the right to proceed 
first, particularly for private-law claims. If private parties have this 
option and choose to decline or accept socially suboptimal results, then 
government attorneys may be needed to fill the deterrence gap.273 Indeed, 
as long as public actions do not preclude private ones, individuals will 
retain their right to a day in court independent of governmental action—
and the monetary offset is less concerning for suits vindicating non-
pecuniary interests. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Law enforcement faces random errors, biases, resource constraints, 
information problems, and agency costs. Lawmakers can harness multiple 
diverse agents to help mitigate these concerns if they sensibly link 
institutional design to legislative preferences. Of course, redundant 
enforcement is not the right approach for all situations and in all forms. 
Legislatures must make the underlying judgments about which 
pathologies are sufficiently pernicious to justify redundant 
                                            
269 Perhaps intervention is useful here. In many current regimes, intervention 
cuts off the second suit, but it also could have consequences for available damages. For 
example, if a party intervenes within the designated period, it would be entitled to full 
compensatory damages; if it does not, then a future suit would be subject to offset. 
270 Even if the prior case took the form of a class action, plaintiffs had rights to 
receive notice, opt out of litigation, and object to settlement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
Certainly the government would be within its rights to distribute recoveries from the 
second suit, but such distributions should not be required. 
271 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: 
The Right to Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153 (discussing dignity, 
participation, effectuation, and deterrence values). 
272 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (referring to “[o]ur deep-
rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court”); Owen M. Fiss, 
The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965 (1993). For a discussion of the revival of 
“individual justice” in private law, see Nathan B. Oman & Jason Solomon, The Supreme 
Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 1109 (2013).  
273 And because the private party had her chance, the government in the second 
suit need not be preoccupied by individual (as opposed to social) goals. Cf. supra notes __ 
and accompanying text (making a similar argument regarding compensation). 
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enforcement.274 Legislatures have to decide whether to organize decisions 
based on enforcement unit or regulated area.275 And legislatures must set 
enforcement policy by making choices about procedural and remedial 
design.276 These are the hard questions: how should we weigh the costs 
and benefits, and how should we structure enforcement regimes?277 
Rejecting redundancy out of hand, or ignoring its central role in the 
modern regulatory state, results in a failure to grapple with these 
debates. A better approach acknowledges that redundant public-private 
enforcement is part of the enforcement landscape and thinks more deeply 
about when and how this strategy can form a valuable part of a broader 
regulatory regime. 
                                            
274 See supra note __ (discussing, for example, areas in which the legislature may 
be willing to accept over-enforcement). 
275 One could think of CAFA, as applied in Mississippi, as making a decision 
based on enforcement unit—state attorneys general pursuing parens patriae actions are 
treated differently than class counsel. See supra notes __. Whereas the reliance on 
citizen-suits in nearly all environmental statutes might be seen as an enforcement 
strategy based on the regulated area. See supra note __.  
276 See, e.g., Burbank, et al., supra note __; Wolff, supra note __; FARHANG, supra 
note __. See also infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing Shady Grove). 
277 Relatedly, courts should remain sensitive to enforcement priorities reflected in 
enforcement design. But there are reasons to be concerned that this is not always the 
case. For example, in Shady Grove, the Supreme Court held that New York plaintiffs 
could maintain a class action for state law claims even though New York law would have 
prohibited aggregation of those claims in state court. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). Aggregation 
rules reflect a legislative judgment about enforcement, thus the decision in Shady Grove 
trumped a legislative choice about the scope of private enforcement. See, e.g., Stephen B. 
Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2010). Courts also may have trumped legislative choices when they 
converted one-way preclusion rules in federal civil rights statutes into mutual preclusion 
rules, see supra notes __, or when they inferred private causes of action. Readers also may 
think that Mississippi is another example of this phenomenon, as the Court rejected 
CAFA’s preference for consolidation in favor of a strict definition of “mass action.” See 
supra note __. That said, the Mississippi decision seems consistent with state law, so the 
outcome may reflect legislative primacy after all. 
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